How ought Christians to approach moral problems? This is a question of method in moral theology. It is also a question of who is in authority to speak on matters of morality. In this essay, the moral methodology of Richard McCormick, S.J., one of the most powerful voices in contemporary Roman Catholic theology, is explored in depth. Attention is focused on its critical details, its development over time, and in particular McCormick's use of authorities in Roman Catholicism. It is argued (...) that his ethical theory is built around one central insight: that the human person in all its facets and dimensions is the criterion of the rightness and wrongness of human actions. (shrink)

The doctrine of double effect has a firm, respected position within Roman Catholic medical ethics. Neil M. Gorsuch, a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, believes that this doctrine also enjoys a central place within U.S. law. This essay examines and assesses Gorsuch’s thesis. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.1 (Spring 2011): 31–40.

A comprehensive, critical evaluation of the ideas of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, including a summary of his life.

Paperback. The book treats two general questions: 1. Whether Erasmanism and Erasmian Humanism existed as a recognizable attitude during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; 2. Whether Erasminism represented a definable middle way between the confessional conflicts of these times. How important was Erasmanism in these respects? The treatment of these two questions is geographically limited to those countries where Erasmus himself was active: Italy, The Netherlands, Holy Roman Empire, Switzerland and England.Erasmanism as a concept has hardly been studied before, (...) although the term is used freely by scholars of the early modern period. This book is a first attempt at a begriffsgeschichte of Erasminism. (shrink)

Growing concern has been expressed that we have entered a “post-truth” era in which each of us willfully believes whatever we choose, aided and abetted by alternative and social media that spin alternative realities for boutique consumption. A prime example of the belief in alternative realities is said to be acceptance of “conspiracy theories”—a term that is often used as a pejorative to indict claims of conspiracy that are so obviously absurd that only the unhinged could believe them. The epistemological (...) standard often involved in this indictment, however—the standard of “obvious” falsity—invites subjectivity in its application, because what is obviously false to one person can be common sense to another. This is not just a truism; considerable research suggests that people’s political beliefs, in general, and their acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories in particular, tends in large part to be determined by partisan, ideological, and other priors. (shrink)

Standard approaches to the morality of abortion typically founder on the question of the “personhood” of the fetus. This paper attempts to avoid this problem by developing an alternative approach in which philosophical positions are derived not from a presumed right to life but from the special moral obligations of parents to nurture their immature children. After a discussion of the notion of parental responsibility, three leading accounts of the acquisition of parental responsibilities are examined: one based on biological relationship, (...) one based on consent, and one based on causal responsibility. The consequences of each of these positions for the morality of abortion are examined and each is considered in relation to cases involving nonstandard methods of procreation, e.g. surrogate mothering, artificial insemination by donor, and embryo transfer. On the basis of these cases, I argue that the model based on causal responsibility provides the most adequate criterion for the ascription of parental responsibility. While some discussion is devoted to the question of implementing this model as social policy, the main thrust of the paper is not so much to defend a particular policy on the morality of abortion as it is to argue for the approach to the problem based on the notion of parental responsibility over the more familiar approach relying on the right to life. (shrink)

Provability, Computability and Reflection.

In their “social contextual view” of emotional mimicry, authors Hess and Fischer (2022) put forward emotional mimicry as a social regulator, considering it a social act, bound to certain affiliative contexts or goals. In this commentary, we argue that the core function of mimicry is to ease predicting conspecifics’ behaviours and the environment, and that as a consequence, this often smoothens social interactions. Accordingly, we make three main points. First, we argue that there is no good reason to believe that (...) the mimicry of negative expressions is fundamentally different than the mimicry of positive or ambiguous or autonomic expressions. Second, we give examples of empirical evidence that mimicry is not always a social act. Third, we show that mimicry has primary benefits for the mimicker. As such, we will briefly summarise and elaborate on the relevant findings in these respects, and propose a comparative, multi-method and ecologically valid approach which can explain the multifaceted character of the phenomenon. (shrink)

Let T 1 , T 2 be countable first-order theories, M i ⊨ T i , and ������ any regular ultrafilter on λ ≥ $\aleph_{0}$ . A longstanding open problem of Keisler asks when T 2 is more complex than T 1 , as measured by the fact that for any such λ, ������, if the ultrapower (M 2 ) λ /������ realizes all types over sets of size ≤ λ, then so must the ultrapower (M 1 ) λ /������. (...) In this paper, building on the author's prior work [12] [13] [14], we show that the relative complexity of first-order theories in Keisler's sense is reflected in the relative graph-theoretic complexity of sequences of hypergraphs associated to formulas of the theory. After reviewing prior work on Keisler's order, we present the new construction in the context of ultrapowers, give various applications to the open question of the unstable classification, and investigate the interaction between theories and regularizing sets. We show that there is a minimum unstable theory, a minimum TP 2 theory, and that maximality is implied by the density of certain graph edges (between components arising from Szemerédi-regular decompositions) remaining bounded away from 0, 1. We also introduce and discuss flexible ultrafilters, a relevant class of regular ultrafilters which reflect the sensitivity of certain unstable (non low) theories to the sizes of regularizing sets, and prove that any ultrafilter which saturates the minimal TP 2 theory is flexible. (shrink)

The Birkhoff-Maltsev problem asks for a characterization of those lattices each of which is isomorphic to the lattice L(K) of all subquasivarieties for some quasivariety K of algebraic systems. The current status of this problem, which is still open, is discussed. Various unsolved questions that are related to the Birkhoff-Maltsev problem are also considered, including ones that stem from the theory of propositional logics.

We introduce the notion of an alphabetic trace of a cut-free intuitionistic prepositional proof and show that it serves to characterize the equality of arrows in cartesian closed categories. We also show that alphabetic traces improve on the notion of the generality of proofs proposed in the literature. The main theorem of the paper yields a new and considerably simpler solution of the coherence problem for cartesian closed categories than those in [11, 14].